此篇文章由版主撰寫, 刊登在工商時報2010/05/17
Where’s the Goldman Sachs That I Used to Know?
在金融風暴發生後,美國五大投資銀行中有三家已經消失(雷曼兄弟破產拆售、摩根大通買下貝爾斯登、美國銀行買下美林),只剩高盛與摩根史坦利;競爭對手變少,存活下來的投資銀行營運應該更順暢,為什麼高盛卻頻傳負面新聞?
美國證管會(Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC)指控(file)高盛出售的合成債權擔保憑證(Synthetic Collateralized Debt Obligation, Synthetic CDO)(註1),沒有向投資人充分說明風險,導致買家慘賠。而在控告事件發生同時,歐巴馬政府要推動金融監管改革,到底是政治操縱目的控告高盛以提高金融改革呼聲,還是歐巴馬政府真的有心要重整華爾街市場 ?
文章所指的合成CDO商品,是高盛2007年2月推出的「珠算2007-AC1」(Abacus 2007-AC1)。在2006-07年期間,由對沖基金經理人鮑森(John Paulson)挑選出123張評等不佳的次級抵押貸款債券(Mortgage-Backed Securities, MBS),再請高盛包裝成合成CDO商品,以便鮑森避險基金公司(Paulson hedge fund)作空房市。法律專家認為,由於這種投資商品很難解釋到底如何組成,使得美國證管會很難舉證高盛誤導投資者。而美國證管會控訴理由是,鮑森聲譽不佳是眾所皆知,而且該公司副總托爾(Fabrice Tourre)跟投資人解釋,「珠算2007-AC1」是由另一家獨立的ACA管理公司所設計,隱瞞鮑森避險基金公司正在做空這項產品的事實。一向被認為具有專業(professionalism)、清廉(integrity)的高盛卻與鮑森合作詐騙(hoodwink)投資者。
無論高盛感覺自己有多委屈(how wronged Goldman officials now feel),還是得採取合作態度,不挑釁擺脫情緒(Goldman’s mantra should be cooperation, not defiance)。應該放棄“全面防守”(all out defense)的傳統公關和法律策略。高盛主管應該細細讀華爾街日報這篇報導,因為它提供了很多策略思維,是當局者看不到的死角。
註1:
債權擔保憑證(CDO)是分層給付的金融產品。把許多固定支付現金流的債券集合成一個資產池,然後分多層出售。最高層CDO(風險低)買家拿最低利率,但優先獲得支付;最底層CDO買家拿最高利率,萬一違約就首先承受損失。合成CDO則不把實際的資產證券放進資產池,而是拿信用違約交換(CDS)合約放進資產池。
file /suit /accuse
這三個字皆為控告或訴訟的意思。
“file”為及物與不及物動詞,意指控告以及歸檔的意思,名詞為檔案文件、銼刀與縱列的意思。例如:She has filed a lawsuit against the company. 她那家公司提出告訴。
“suit”可數名詞為訴訟意思,與”lawsuit”意義相同。習慣與”file”一起使用:file a suit/lawsuit against sb。例如:The family filed a suit against the hospital for negligence. 他們家控告醫院疏失。
“accuse”為及物動詞,為控告以及讉責的意思,用法為:accuse sb of doing sth。例如:I don’t want to accuse him of telling lies. 我不想指責他說謊。
Dispute/quarrel/debate
可當及物與不及物動詞,為爭論以及質疑的意思,尤指在公眾場合雙方意見不合之爭論。其它類似的字有”quarrel”,但此字適用於雙方認識彼此,為不重要的小事爭吵。”debate”的動詞為辯論或者有謹慎考慮思考某件事情的意思,其中辯論是對於某項主題提出不同意見討論,名詞為辯論與辯論會的意思。
例句:
1. The two countries disputed for territorial problems. 這兩個國家爭論國土問題。
2. He always quarrels with his wife over trivial matters. 他老是跟他太太吵一些小事.
3. There has been intense debate over tax cut. 最近關於減稅話題有激烈的辯論。
文章中所指的「Troubled Asset Relief Program(TARP)」問題資產救援方案產生背景:2008年9月,雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)宣布破產,使得全球金融市場陷入恐慌。為了解決美國金融業問題,美國政府於布希政府時代提出了TARP計畫。該計畫主要直接向銀行注資,但在缺乏效率及有效監督下,並未有效緩解信貸體系停滯的現象,反而產生銀行高級主管以紓困金自肥的弊端。所以文章作者才說,高盛從TARP中收取到多少注資,而這些注資有多少再流入鮑森的口袋中。在TARP成效不彰下,歐巴馬政府推出新版紓困案,甚至將TARP紓困案名字更改為「金融穩定計畫」(Financial Stability Plan,FSP)。
原文:
Where’s The Goldman Sachs That I Used To Know?
2010年04月21日14:39
‘Surreal’ was the word Goldman Sachs Group’s Fabrice Tourre used to describe a meeting in which the firm of hedge-fund billionaire John Paulson discussed with an investor a portfolio of mortgage-backed securities it eventually planned to short. That Goldman Sachs, a name once synonymous with professionalism and integrity, now stands accused by the Securities and Exchange Commission of fraud also might be deemed surreal.
It’s hard to imagine the damage that these developments have done already to Goldman Sachs’s reputation. The company has always maintained a public position that the business of investment banking depends on trust, integrity and putting clients’ interests first.
Whether those clients remain loyal to Goldman, and whether the firm can attract new ones, remain to be seen. Investors’ reaction to the news was swift and negative: Goldman shares closed down 13% Friday after the SEC filed its suit. Goldman says it is innocent and will fight the accusations. The bank deserves its day in court, and legal experts have said the SEC faces a tough task in proving the company misled investors about how its complex investment vehicles were constructed. Given the public anger at Wall Street, and the criticism of the SEC’s failure to regulate more effectively before the financial crisis struck, it’s worth considering that Goldman makes an enticing political target, regardless of the suit’s merits.
Goldman hasn’t disputed the basic facts in the SEC’s narrative: (1) that the company allowed its client Mr. Paulson, who famously made billions betting that subprime mortgages would default, to play a role in the selection of a portfolio of the worst imaginable subprime mortgages that would be packaged into a collateralized-debt obligation, and (2) that the bank failed to disclose to clients to whom it sold those CDOs that it had, in effect, let the fox into the henhouse. Goldman claims its sophisticated clients wouldn’t have cared about such information or considered it important, but if that’s the case, why did Goldman conceal it? Goldman collected millions of dollars in fees from Mr. Paulson, who bet against the doomed securities, and from the clients who invested in them.
For many years, I was a Goldman Sachs shareholder. I bought shares soon after the firm went public in 1999 and held them until I sold them last year, as I reported in this column. I owned them and recommended them on several occasions because I believed in Goldman’s integrity and the culture that fostered it. I have had friends who work at Goldman or who have worked there. To me, they embody the best of Wall Street. They’re smart, well-educated, thoughtful, professional and hard-working. This is the Goldman I invested in, not the Goldman alleged to have collaborated with someone like Mr. Paulson to hoodwink investors. I’m not even that concerned about whether the Paulson deal passes legal muster. To me, it fails the higher standards of honesty and professionalism that Goldman once embodied and urgently needs to restore. Then, and only then, would I want to own Goldman shares again.
In its first-quarter earnings conference call Tuesday morning, the company continued to deny wrongdoing and cited its net losses on the deal. Greg Palm, the firm’s general counsel, said Goldman ‘would never intentionally mislead anyone,’ and that the company ‘would never condone inappropriate behavior.’
To regain investor trust, Goldman must abandon conventional public relations and legal strategies that call for an all-out defense. It should stop saying it will fight the charges aggressively and that the SEC’s suit is ‘completely unfounded.’ No matter how wronged Goldman officials now feel, they must put those feelings aside and view this matter from the perspective of clients, investors, politicians and the public. Goldman’s mantra should be cooperation, not defiance.
When an institution depends on trust and is accused of wrongdoing, it needs to get ahead of the investigators. It needs to learn the facts, share them with the public, impose accountability on its employees, and take any steps necessary to remedy the problem and restore trust. I say this as someone who has written about wrongdoing on Wall Street for years and watched once-venerable firms like Kidder Peabody and Drexel Burnham Lambert ignore such advice and pass into oblivion.
This needn’t be Goldman’s fate. It’s already unfortunate that we’ve learned about the Paulson deals from the SEC and the press rather than from Goldman itself, especially because the firm says it’s been on notice since last July that it might be sued. But it isn’t too late for the firm to move boldly to restore trust.
Goldman needs to explain:
— Why was a firm like Mr. Paulson’s allowed to choose the securities in the CDO it was planning to bet against? Although Mr. Paulson’s firm may have been smart to bet against subprime mortgages, this deal was like shooting fish in a barrel. Who else gets this kind of access, what does Goldman receive in return, and are their roles disclosed? (Though Mr. Paulson hasn’t been accused of any wrongdoing, it would be interesting to know how much money from the Troubled Asset Relief Program paid to Amercan International Group, Goldman and others ended up going to him.)
— Who at Goldman was responsible for giving Mr. Paulson such extraordinary access and then failing to disclose it? Surely it wasn’t Mr. Tourre, the 31-year-old Stanford graduate named as a defendant in the SEC suit. Who did he report to? What was the hierarchy of oversight? In other words, where does the buck stop?
— Legal issues aside, does Goldman really believe this deal meets its own standards of integrity, fairness and professionalism? The notion that purchasers of the securities wouldn’t care about Mr. Paulson’s role already fails the common-sense test. Such an argument would be far more persuasive if it came from the clients who bought them rather than Goldman. And it’s no excuse that other firms were carrying out similar deals with comparable disclosure.
— If Goldman concludes such a deal didn’t meet its standards, it needs to acknowledge that and take whatever steps are necessary to prevent it from happening again. Someone has to be responsible and held accountable, perhaps even a highly valued and revered high-level official. Goldman needs to do this before it is forced to do so by a court, regulators or Congress. This will be painful. It takes courage, objectivity, vision, and perhaps most of all, humility.
— How will Goldman prevent such conflicts in the future? What is it doing internally to restore a culture of integrity? If Mr. Tourre or any other employee thought he was caught in a ‘surreal’ situation, to whom could he take such concerns and get a fair hearing?
— The SEC suit isn’t Goldman’s only potential scandal. The Wall Street Journal reported last week that Goldman director Rajat Gupta is being investigated as part of the sprawling Galleon insider-trading investigation. In the article, Goldman declined to comment on whether Mr. Gupta informed the company about having received a notice from prosecutors. What does Goldman know about possible leaks of inside information? Why, when Mr. Gupta told Goldman in March he wouldn’t be standing for re-election, did Goldman chief executive Lloyd Blankfein issue a public statement lavishing praise for his service? And why, for that matter, wasn’t Mr. Gupta asked to resign immediately? Mr. Gupta hasn’t been accused of wrongdoing, and Goldman is right not to prejudge him. But that doesn’t mean Goldman should ignore the evidence or that someone under investigation is entitled to a board seat.
— Are there other investigations we should know about?
These may well be isolated incidents, confined to a few individuals, their timing an unfortunate coincidence. If so, Goldman has all the more reason to get ahead of the scandal, get the facts and disclose them. It may require swallowing some pride and suffering some criticism. It’s also the right thing to do.
James B. Stewart